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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

No. 93-7783

AETNA LIFE AND CASUALTY COMPANY,
Appellee,
v.
CAROLYN BARTHELEMY; PETER M. BARTHELEMY;
MICHAEL BARTHELEMY; VICKI MCSPARRAN,
Vicki McSparran,
Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. No. 92-cv-00945)
Submitted under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
June 2, 1994
Before:

SCIRICA, NYGAARD and ALDISERT,
Circuit Judges.
(Filed July 6, 1994)

Ralph B.Pinskey
PINSKEY & FOSTER
121 South Street
Harrisburg, PA 17101
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT
John L. McIntyre
PFAFF, McINTYRE, DUGAS
& HARTYE
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P.O. Box 533
Hollidaysburg, PA

16648

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE
OPINION OF THE COURT

ALDISERT, Circuit Judge.
In this diversity case, we must predict whether the
Pennsylvania courts would obligate an insurer to defend and
indemnify an insured under a homeowner's policy in a state court
action in which a female student at Penn State University alleged
that she was harmed by the son of the insured as a result of his
having sexual relations with her while both were intoxicated. The
district court accepted the theory of Aetna Life and Casualty
Company, Appellee, that Pennsylvania courts would adopt the
inferred intent rule discussed in Wiley v. State Farm Fire & Cas.
Co., 995 F.2d 457 (3d Cir. 1993), and entered a declaratory
judgment that Aetna had no duty to defend or indemnify the
insured.

Vicki McSparran, the plaintiff in the state court

action, has appealed the district court's declaratory judgment
and argues that Pennsylvania courts would apply the general rule
of subjective intent under the circumstances.
The district court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 2201 and § 1332.
§1291.

We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.

The appeal was timely filed under Rule 4(a) of the

Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure.
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The parties have agreed that the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court has not addressed the major issue raised in this appeal.
Our review of a district court's prediction of how Pennsylvania
would interpret the exclusionary clause of a homeowner's policy
is plenary.

Wiley, 995 F.2d at 459.

For the following reasons, we will reverse the judgment
of the district court.

I.
At the time of the incident giving rise to this
litigation, both Ms. McSparran and Michael Barthelemy were
students at Penn State University living in the main campus
dormitory.

At the time of the incident, she was 19 years old and

a virgin and he was 18.

While listening to the campus radio

station, McSparran heard Barthelemy, the disc jockey, announce
that the first person to come to the station and dance with him
would receive a compact disc.

When she arrived at the radio

station, McSparran danced with Barthelemy and received a compact
disc as promised.
Thereafter, Barthelemy promised McSparran that if she
stayed until the conclusion of the radio show and helped him
carry his tapes back to his dormitory room, he would give her
another compact disc.

She agreed, accompanied him to his room

and received another disc.

While in the room, Barthelemy offered

McSparran two drinks of rum and coke, which she accepted.

He

then promised he would give her another compact disc if she would
drink four shots of rum.

It is undisputed that McSparran was an
3

inexperienced drinker, that she had hesitated to drink shots of
rum, that Barthelemy assured her that rum was like beer and would
not affect her, that she drank four shots of rum in a very short
period of time and that she became ill and very drunk.
While McSparran was drinking, Barthelemy also consumed
at least two drinks of rum and coke and at least four shots of
rum.

While McSparran was in an inebriated state, Michael had

sexual relations with her.1
In her state court complaint, McSparran alleged that
Barthelemy was guilty of battery, negligent or reckless conduct
and reckless infliction of emotional distress.

In his defense,

Barthelemy contended that the sexual relations were consensual.
McSparran emphasizes that she did not allege that he used force
or violence, except for the battery count implications. Moreover,
she asserted in each count that he did not "expect or intend that
his conduct would cause the specific injuries that were suffered
by Plaintiff as a result of his conduct."

App. at 22a, 24a, 25a.

In a separate action brought in federal court, Aetna
Life & Casualty Company sought a declaratory judgment that it was
under no duty to defend or indemnify Barthelemy in the state
court action under the intentional harm exclusion in the
Barthelemy's homeowner's policy.

The defendants below included

McSparran, Michael Barthelemy and his parents, Carolyn and Peter
M. Barthelemy, who were the named insured.

1

McSparran filed a

Although the alleged misconduct occurred in Michael Barthelemy's
dormitory, the parties do not contest the applicability of the
Barthelemy's homeowner's policy.
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motion for summary judgment in the declaratory judgment action,
App. at 35a, and Aetna responded with its own motion for summary
judgment.

App. at 41a.
Relying on our decision in Wiley, the district court

granted Aetna's motion for summary judgment and denied
McSparran's motion, inferring Barthelemy's intent to harm
McSparran as a matter of law from the act of non-consensual
sexual intercourse.

Aetna Life & Cas. Co. v. Barthelemy, 836 F.

Supp. 231, 237 (M.D. Pa. 1993).

The district court noted that in

Wiley we inferred an intent to harm in a case of child
molestation by an insured adult, and concluded that "[t]he Third
Circuit's reasons for predicting adoption of the inferred intent
rule in cases of child molestation are no less persuasive when
the alleged victim is an adult."

Id.

McSparran's appeal

followed.
The Barthelemy's homeowner's policy, issued by Aetna,
contains the following exclusion:
1.Coverage E - Personal
Liability and Coverage F - Medical
Payments to Others do not apply to
bodily injury or property damage:
a.which is
expected or intended by
any insured;
App. at 18a.
We must determine whether the inferred intent rule,
which we have previously held applicable to the "exceptional case
of sexual child abuse by an insured adult," Wiley, 995 F.2d at
461, would apply to the alleged sexual misconduct of Barthelemy.
5

II.
Pennsylvania case law teaches us how to begin an
analysis of exclusionary clauses of the type contained in the
Barthelemy's homeowner's policy:
In our state, the exclusionary clause applies
only when the insured intends to cause a
harm. Insurance coverage is not excluded
because the insured's actions are intentional
unless he also intended the resultant damage.
The exclusion is inapplicable even if the
insured should reasonably have foreseen the
injury which his actions caused.
United Servs. Auto. Ass'n v. Elitzky, 358 Pa. Super. 362,
371 (1986) (citation omitted).

The homeowner's policy in this

case excluded bodily injury or property damage "which is expected
or intended by any insured."
"An insured intends an injury if he desired to cause
the consequences of his act or if he acted knowing that such
consequences were substantially certain to result."

Id. at 375.

For a resulting injury to be excluded from coverage, the test to
be applied in Pennsylvania under general liability cases is not
whether the insured intended his actions, but whether the insured
specifically intended to cause harm.

Id. at 372.

As a threshold matter, we will agree with Aetna that
McSparran's state court battery count is excluded from coverage
because, by definition, the tort of battery requires proof of an
intent to cause a harmful or offensive contact.
(Second) of Torts § 13 (1964).
6

See Restatement

Although Elitzky mandates a "subjective intent"
analysis for determining coverage under an exclusionary clause in
most Pennsylvania insurance cases, a different analysis is
applied in "those exceptional cases involving sexual child
abuse."

Wiley, 995 F.2d at 460.

In "those exceptional cases,"

many jurisdictions have adopted what is called the "inferred
intent" rule:

This rule "allows a court to infer an actor's

intent from the nature and character of his or her acts" and to
"establish conclusively the existence of intent to harm as a
matter of law."

Id.

This presumption is conclusive

"notwithstanding the insured's assertion of an absence of
subjective intent to harm."

Id.

Intent may be inferred only

"'if the degree of certainty that the conduct will cause injury
is sufficiently great to justify inferring intent to injure as a
matter of law. . . . [T]he more likely harm is to result from
certain intentional conduct, the more likely intent to harm may
be inferred as a matter of law.'"

Id. at 462 (quoting K.A.G. v.

Stanford, 434 N.W.2d 790, 792-93 (Wis. 1988)).
Inferring intent to harm is strong medicine.
in Wiley that it has "narrow applicability."

Id.

We noted

We cautioned

repeatedly that, "in cases that do not involve sexual child
abuse, Pennsylvania has adopted a general liability standard for
determining the existence of this specific intent that looks to
the insured's actual subjective intent."

Id. at 460.

Moreover,

although we have predicted that Pennsylvania courts would infer
intent to harm in cases of child molestation, they have yet to
decide this precise issue.
7

With these precepts guiding our deliberation, we must
determine whether, under the facts presented, this is a general
liability insurance case in which the court must consider the
insured's subjective intent to harm, or whether it is another
"exceptional" case in which the court may infer the insured's
intent to harm as a matter of law.

III.
The district court extended our teachings in Wiley to
the facts at bar, concluding that an intent to harm McSparran
could be inferred as a matter of law, notwithstanding
Barthelemy's subjective belief that he had consent and
McSparran's repeated assertions that he did not intend the harm
she suffered.

Consequently, the district court held that

Barthelemy's conduct came within the exclusionary clause of the
homeowner's policy.

Barthelemy, 836 F. Supp. at 237.

In so

doing, we believe the court erred.
In deviating from the general liability rule of
considering subjective intent, the district court stated that
this court's "reasons for predicting adoption of the inferred
intent rule in cases of child molestation are no less persuasive
when the alleged victim is an adult.

Like sexual contact with a

child, sexual assault of an adult is a crime."
court continued:

Id. at 236.

The

"Obtaining coverage for the commission of a

criminal act is not within the contemplation of the average
purchaser of homeowner's insurance."
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Id.

We believe that in analogizing this case to Wiley, the
district court, to use a popular idiom, pushed the envelope too
far.

We note first that in this case there is no allegation that

a crime was committed.

McSparran alleged battery, negligent or

reckless conduct and reckless infliction of emotional distress,
App. at 22a-25a, but conceded that Barthelemy did not intend the
harm she suffered as a result of this tortious conduct.
22a, 24a, 25a.

App. at

The district court mischaracterized her complaint

when it stated that she "allege[d] in the underlying action that
Michael Barthelemy induced her to drink alcohol and raped her
while she was under the influence."

Id. at 232.

The record

discloses that the basis of McSparran's state court complaint was
that Barthelemy committed a tort, not a crime.
Moreover, our entire discussion in Wiley was limited to
sexual assault on a child.

The fact that McSparran's assertions

might conceivably give rise to criminal liability is not
dispositive of an insured's intent to harm.

Were it true that

any potential criminal liability would give rise to an inferred
intent to harm and, thereby, exclude coverage under a homeowner's
policy, we would not have emphasized in Wiley that sexual abuse
of a child is a uniquely harmful act calling for the narrowly
applied inferred intent rule.

We simply would have concluded

that, because child molestation is a crime, intent to harm must
be inferred as a matter of law.

Instead, we recognized in Wiley

that subjective intent generally is relevant, even when the
insured has pleaded guilty to a crime.

995 F.2d at 466-67; see

Stidham v. Millvale Sportsmen's Club, 421 Pa. Super. 548, 563
9

(1992) (holding that, because insured's intent to harm remained a
material factual issue, summary judgment was inappropriate,
notwithstanding the fact that insured shot and killed a stranger
in an alcoholic blackout and pleaded guilty to third-degree
murder).
Finally, the district court itself recognized the
differences between this case and Wiley.

It noted that: (1) the

victim in Wiley was the 13-year-old niece of the insured;
McSparran was a 19-year-old adult peer of the insured; (2) there
was no contention in Wiley that the victim consented; the insured
here alleged that McSparran consented; (3) the insured in Wiley
pleaded guilty to criminal charges; no criminal charges were
filed against the insured here; and (4) here both adult
participants in the sexual conduct were intoxicated.

Id. at 236.

IV.
Analogies can be considered one of the most important
aspects of legal argument.

Analogy is the method used to

determine whether factual differences contained in the case at
bar and those of the case compared are material or irrelevant.
One must always appraise an analogical argument very
carefully.

Several criteria may be used:
•The acceptability of the analogy will vary
proportionately with the number of
circumstances that have been analyzed.
•The acceptability will depend upon the
number of positive resemblances
(similarities) and negative resemblances
(dissimilarities).
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•The acceptability will be influenced by the
relevance of the purported analogies. An
argument based on a single relevant analogy
connected with a single instance will be more
cogent than one which points out a dozen
irrelevant considerations.
Wiley and the cases cited to support its reasoning
stand for the proposition that Pennsylvania courts would depart
from the general liability test of subjective intent to cause
harm in the limited circumstance of sexual assault upon a child.
The reason for the rule of inferred intent is a societal
recognition that, because a child lacks the capacity to give
consent, sexual activity foisted upon that child by an insured
adult raises the irrebuttable inference that the adult intended
to harm that child, regardless of the insured's subjective
intent.

The reason for the rule is inexorably intertwined with

the tender age of the child.

See, e.g., B.B. V. Continental Ins.

Co., 8 F.3d 1288, 1293-94 (8th Cir. 1994) ("Under Missouri law,
the crime of deviate sexual intercourse with a person less than
fourteen years of age requires no proof of intent on the part of
the perpetrator.

Thus, the Missouri legislature and the Missouri

Supreme Court recognize that sexual molestation of a child is a
crime for which the subjective intent of the perpetrator is
irrelevant.") (citations omitted).

Where a child is not a

participant in the act, there is no reason for the rule.

And, in

the felicitous expression of Karl Llewellyn, "Where stops the
reason, there stops the rule."2

2

Karl N. Llewellyn, Jurisprudence: Realism in Theory and Practice
217 (1962).
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Thus, applying the criteria for a proper analogy to the
teachings of Wiley, the number of positive resemblances are
minimal and the number of dissimilarities extensive -- here, the
putative victim was an adult and not a child, there was no
allegation of a criminal act but rather of a negligent or
reckless act, there was an assertion by the insured of consent
and an assertion by the putative victim that the insured did not
intend the harm she suffered.

Accordingly, our prediction is

that Pennsylvania would apply the rule of general liability in
this case:

For the exclusionary clause to apply, the insurer had

to prove that Barthelemy had the specific subjective intent to
harm McSparran.
In sum, we hold that the exclusionary clause does not
exclude torts of negligence or recklessness.

"In the event that

the complaint alleges a cause of action which may fall within the
coverage of the policy, the insurer is obligated to defend."
Stidham, 421 Pa. Super. at 564 (citing Hartford Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Moorhead, 396 Pa. Super. 234, 238-39 (1990)).3
V.
Under these circumstances we conclude that Aetna failed
to meet its burden of proving that the exclusionary clause

3

Nor may Aetna find comfort in the Pennsylvania criminal code
under which voluntary intoxication may not be "introduced to
negative the element of intent of the offense." 18 Pa. Cons.
Stat. § 308. In this case, no criminal act was alleged and
intent plays no role in allegations of negligent and reckless
conduct. It would seem that the voluntary intoxication analogy
could be used only by claimants to rebut an insurance carrier's
invocation of the exclusionary clause. See Wiley, 995 F.2d at
466; Stidham, 421 Pa. Super. at 563.
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applied.

We hold that the district court erred in applying the

inferred intent rule and that Aetna failed to prove Barthelemy's
subjective intent to harm McSparran as a matter of law.
The judgment of the district court in favor of Aetna
will be reversed and the proceedings remanded with a direction
that the district court grant McSparran's motion for summary
judgment to the extent that the negligent and reckless conduct
allegations in her state court complaint are not excluded from
coverage under the homeowner's policy.
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